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ABSTRACT 
From a consumer protection perspective, this contribution analyses 
four contractual legal frames potentially applicable to the triangular 
contractual structure of online intermediary platforms. For each 
framework, criteria are derived, and it is discussed how and if these 
criteria are met in regards to intermediary platforms. The legal 
frameworks are 1. The Platform as employer; 2. The platform as the 
main contracting party; 3. The Platform as intermediary and 4. The 
platform as a secondary obligated party. It is discussed how the 
intermediary platforms challenge some of the basic considerations 
behind some of the legal frameworks. The contribution helps qualify the 
ongoing deliberations of legislators and academics on (re-)framing the 
legal frame(s) of intermediary platforms.    
1. INTRODUCTION 
Intermediary platforms are the key drivers of the platform 
economy. Under the positive value-laden concept of ‘sharing economy’, 
the platforms experienced goodwill in the early rise of the platform 
economy. However, following the honeymoon period, first the affected 
‘old’ businesses raised the issue of unfair competition and demanded a 
level playing field. Later, concerns about the challenge of protection 
paradigms of employees and consumers were voiced. The element of 
‘sharing’ was not as prevailing for some of the platforms as first 
advertised and therefore, detached from the concept of sharing, the 
platforms are to be governed by the existing legal framework of contract 
law. Here, the identification of the parties plays a crucial role in order to 
establish their legal position. However, preliminary research has shown 
that the platforms’ triangular contractual structure (the two-sided 
structure) does not fit well into existing legal frames based on a two-party 
structure (‘chain’/‘tube’). Evidently, challenges arise especially in the 
areas where legislators have intervened into the principle of freedom of 
contract. This legal intervention has taken place in the areas where a 
weaker party can be identified such as in the case of the relationship 
between a consumer and a trader and an employee and an employer. 
Thus, especially consumers have been a still increasing object for 
protective legislation in Denmark and in the EU. If the legal paradigm of 
consumer protection does not apply to the platform structure, the 
consumer is not protected, and the policy question then arises, whether 
this is a desirable consequence of the platforms. If not, action needs to 
be taken in order to either make the existing protective legislation apply 
or to make a new consumer protection scheme suited for the platform 
economy. Such a scheme does not necessarily need to entail legislation 
but could also be facilitation of self-regulation or utilising digital 
platforms as partners in the regulation – at least in the areas where the 
platforms have clear incentives to behave in a way compatible with 
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public policy. But before engaging into developing new legislation or 
finding other alternatives, it is important to establish the extent of 
application of the existing legislation in relation to platforms, and 
therefore, this article will provide an insight into how platforms fit into 
four legal frames relevant for consumer protection. The four legal frames 
are identified within Danish law, and they are selected because of their 
potential influence on consumer protection when applied on the 
triangular business structure of intermediary platforms. The frameworks 
are: 1. The platform as employer; 2. The platform as the main 
contracting party; 3. The Platform as intermediary and 4. The platform 
as a secondary obligated party.1 In framework 1 and 3, it is relevant to 
delimit the scope of the article to peer2peer (P2P) intermediary 
platforms on which a peer-provider and a peer-customer register in 
order to enter into to the main contract with each other. In framework 2 
and 4, the provider can also be a business since the focal point in these 
frameworks is to determine if the platform instead of or maybe along 
with the provider can be liable for performance of the main contract. 
However, in all frameworks, the article does not include social platforms 
and search engines etc. ‘Peer-provider’ is to be understood as a private 
person selling his labour or his goods – however, much of the 
uncertainty is exactly related to whether such a private person is actually 
something else when acting through the platform. The P2P platform, in 
particular, raises questions in regards to consumer protection of the 
peer-customer2 and also protection of the non-business peer-provider. 
The legal frameworks to be discussed here are focused primarily on the 
contractual relation between the three parties. The methodology of the 
analyses presented in this article is legal dogmatic as the aim primarily is 
to establish the legal position of consumers in the situation where the 
current Danish legal paradigm of consumer protection is faced with P2P 
or B2C intermediary platforms. The focus in the article will be on 
Danish law with incorporation of views and cases of other jurisdictions 
in order to qualify the discussion of the legal frameworks.        
‘The jury in this case will be handed a square peg and asked to 
choose between two round holes’ (District Judge Vince Chhabria, 
California).3 The quote is frequently used by scholars because of its 
perfect illustrative metaphor of the core legal challenge with intermediary 
platforms – not just in relation to the specific dispute in the case. The 
                                                        
1 Parts of this contribution contains content from a book chapter in Danish, Sørensen, 
Marie Jull, Digitale formidlingsplatforme: Disruption af forbrugerretsparadigmet? in 
Dahl, Børge; Riis, Thomas; Trzaskowski, Jan, Festskrift til Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, 2016, 
185 and an article in Danish, Sørensen, Marie Jull, Digitale formidlingsplatforme - 
formidlingsreglen i dansk forbrugerret, Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen (UfR), U2017B.119. 
2 Busch, Christoph; Schulte-Nölke, Hans; Wiewiórowska-Domagalska, Aneta and Zoll, 
Frederic, The rise of the Platform Economy: A new Challenge for EU Consumer Law? 
EuCML, 1 2016, 3. 
3  Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015).   
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quote is from a US case regarding the legal status of a platform-driver on 
the platform Lyft (a ‘driver-on-demand’-platform). The platform-driver 
(the ‘square peg’) claimed to be an employee of the platform (a round 
hole) and not an independent contractor (the other hole). The quote 
illustrates that establishing the legal position of this platform worker 
comes with much difficulty, as set legal definitions might not be 
compatible with the ‘new’ reality of intermediary platforms. This is not 
only the case in the US and not only the case with platform workers. The 
existing carpet of neatly crafted and fairly close attached legally defined 
boxes might not fit when the real life of intermediary platforms is rolled 
out over the carpet. The real life platform participants and transactions 
will not fall into the boxes, as they do not fit the legal definition of the 
boxes. Thus, leaving the platforms floating over the boxes, giving room 
for the platforms to define themselves and creating their own ‘legal’ 
regimes with the risk of legal uncertainty and lack of protection for 
platform users and others.  
Most platforms define themselves merely as providers of a 
facilitating tool and, therefore, only as intermediaries. For this 
contribution, the term ‘intermediary’ is not to be understood as a strict 
legal term, but only as someone who establishes contact between two 
parties with variant degrees of interference and control. According to 
contract law, as an intermediary, the platform has no contractual 
obligations in regards to the contract between the two users. The existing 
substantial consumer protection regulation based on the existence of a 
weak party vis-á-vis a business4 does not normally apply to P2P 
transactions in regards to the main contract. It will, however, apply in the 
user-platform contract. The four legal frames all entail a framing where 
consumer protection might be triggered because of a possible alternative 
identification of either the platform or the peer-seller.    
There are many variations of intermediary platforms5 – also within 
P2P platforms - but it is not for this article to categorise them. The 
analyses of the four legal frames will be conducted at a general level 
deriving criteria and discussing their applicability on platforms.  
                                                        
4 ECJ case law has developed a ‘system of protection’ which also entails other 
presumptions. See for example Banco Españiol de Crédito, C-618/10, para 39 - 42 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, 14 June 2012. See also Schulte-Nölke, Hans, The brave new 
world of EU consumer law – Without consumers, or even without law?, EuCML 4 
(2015). 
5 Se blandt andre Tilenius, Stephanie, The New Curated Consumer Marketplace Model: 
10 Criteria For Success, Forbes 10/03/1013 and Cand. jur. Styrishave, Michael, Digitale 
platforme i en kontraktretlig kontekst, (2016, Master Thesis, Aalborg University).  
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2. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
2.1. THE PLATFORM AS AN EMPLOYER 
Establishing whether the relation between the platform and the 
peer-provider is an employment relationship is of course relevant only 
when the platform is a labour-platform – a peer-provider selling his 
labour (such as transportation or cleaning) to the peer-customer. If the 
peer-provider is actually an employee of the platform, it will affect the 
contractual relationship with the peer-customer, and in addition, the 
peer-provider will be protected by labour law.6 In the case of an 
employment relationship between the peer-provider and the platform, 
the peer-customer will have entered into a contract with the platform, 
providing that the peer-provider has not somehow gone out of his 
mandate as employee. The peer-customer can then claim consumer 
rights against the platform as his counter party in the main contract.  
In Denmark, no court cases have been filed regarding the issue of 
employment on intermediary platforms. Through an analysis of Danish 
case law regarding the definition of employee/employer in general, 
Danish Scholar Ole Hasselbalch has derived five elements to be 
considered when determining whether a person is to be regarded as an 
independent contractor or an employee:7 1) The degree of the potential 
employer’s right to direct and control the work performed by the person 
in question (subordination); 2) The arrangement of the financial 
relationship between the parties (for example, how the pay is disbursed 
and calculated and who is the bearer of the entrepreneurial risk and 
provider of the material); 3) The obligation to carry out the work 
personally or the right to have someone else perform the work; 4) The 
personal relationship between the potential employee and employer, 
including the place of work and 5) The potential employee’s social and 
                                                        
6 See for elaboration on labour protection, for example: De Stefano, Valerio, The rise 
of the ‘just-in-time workforce’: On-demand work, crowdwork and labour protection in 
the ‘gig-economy, International Labour Office inclusive Labour Markets, Labour 
Relations and Working Conditions Branch. Geneva: ILO, 2016, Conditions of Work 
and Employment Series No. 71. There might be slight differences between Member 
States’ and EU’s definition of the scope of labour law in regards to ‘worker’ and 
‘employee’. The EU is known to have a broad scope both in the high end in regard to 
business managers and in the low end in regards to accepting a low threshold of 
working hours see Christensen, Emma Engelsted and Jensen, Julie Pia, Den kommende 
ferielov – lønmodtagerens retsstilling, 2017, 
https://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/280805747/Den_kommende_ferielov___Lon
modtagerens_retsstilling.pdf.  
7 Hasselbalch, Ole, Ansættelsesret & Personalejura, 4. udgave, 2012, p. 31 et seqq. The 5 
elements are translated by Jens Kristiansen in The Concept of ’Employee’: The Position 
in Denmark, in Waas, Bernd (ed) and van Voss, Guus Heerma, Restatement of Labour 
Law in Europe, The Concept of Employee, I, 141. 
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occupational position, especially whether the worker is primarily 
considered to be comparable with an employee or a self-employed 
worker (an overall assessment). The labour platforms come in different 
shapes with different ways of contracting and interacting with the peer-
provider. Presumably, for those platforms who provide a single service 
(e.g. transportation, cleaning, delivery of food or other etc.) and where 
this single service is connected to a platform brand with a distinct service 
profile (e.g. Uber), it will be easier to fit the platforms into the category 
of employer. If the platform instructs/suggests to the peer-provider to 
perform the service in a certain way and sets out the legal frame as well 
as the operational frame (payment system, routing software) to fulfil the 
main contract, this will address the first of the five elements presented. If 
the platform sets the price for the service and controls the payments and 
also limits the supplier to perform the service personally, this will address 
the second and third element. Labour platforms can be based both on 
white-collar labour and blue-collar labour. If the peer-provider has to 
work away from home, which is typical for blue-collar labour, this might 
speak in favour of an employee/employer relationship, especially if the 
work does not require a specific skill. Lastly, and related to element 
number 5, if companies providing similar services in a similar way usually 
are considered employers, this will speak in favour of an 
employee/employer relationship. In general, what can be regarded as the 
pivotal point in categorising a peer-provider as an employee is the fact 
that most peer-providers have the freedom to decide when and for how 
long they want to work and to a certain extend also what tasks they 
accept. Thus, one of the traditionally most important elements in the 
employment relationship – the fixed working hours – is not present. This 
element will vary in importance depending on the type of platform work. 
In addition, especially in regards to the transportation platforms, another 
element speaking against an employment relationship is the fact that the 
drivers use their own material (cars or bikes). This is typically a fact that 
will indicate that the driver is an independent contractor or self-
employed person. The Danish court cases against Uber drivers have not 
been concerned with employment relationships but have focused on 
illegal transportation of passengers.8  
Within EU labour law, the definition of employee has been subject 
to several ECJ cases, in particular within the area of free movement of 
workers9 and competition.10 There have not yet been cases targeted 
                                                        
8 U2017.796 Ø. The Uber drivers were convicted of illegal transport of passengers 
among other because of lack of the necessary permits.  
9 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Reaffirming the free movement of workers: rights and major developments, 
COM(2010)373 final.  
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specifically at platform workers. The EU Commission welcomes the 
platform economy but also acknowledges the challenges it brings in 
regards to the different considerations of the three parties.11 In the 
agenda for the collaborative economy, the Commission states that:  
In order to help people make full use of their potential, 
increase participation in the labour market and boost 
competitiveness, while ensuring fair working conditions and 
adequate and sustainable social protection, Member States 
should: 
- assess the adequacy of their national employment rules 
considering the different needs of workers and self-employed 
people in the digital world as well as the innovative nature of 
collaborative business models; 12 
Also in this specific agenda in regards to the three party relations, 
the Commission refers to the definition of ‘worker’ developed in ECJ 
case law.13  
Here, a cumulative list consists of three criteria to be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis (text in parentheses added by the author). 
- the existence of a subordination link; (distinction between 
self-employed and worker) 
- the nature of work; (genuine activity) and 
- the presence of a remuneration (distinction between a 
volunteer and a worker) 
The subordination link refers to the platform directing the choice 
of activity, the remuneration and the working conditions. In further 
elaboration on the three criteria in regards to collaborative economy, the 
Commission makes clear that in order to meet the first criteria, it is not 
sufficient merely to pass on payments from one user to another. 
However, if the peer-provider is not free to choose what services she 
provides and how and for how much, this will speak in favour of the 
platform being subordinate. To meet the first criteria, it is not necessary 
for the platform to actually manage and supervise continuously. The 
                                                                                                              
10 Schiek, Dagmar; Gideon, Andrea (2018): Outsmarting the gig-economy through 
collective bargaining – EU competition law as a barrier to smart cities?, International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology. 
11Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A 
European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM(2016)356 final, 2 et seq. 
12 A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM(2016)356 final, 13 et seq. 
13 A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM(2016)356 final, 12 and 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Reaffirming the free movement of workers: rights and major developments, 
COM(2010)373 final, 4-6 (with references to ECJ case law). 
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second criteria aims at leaving out “services on such a small scale as to be 
regarded as purely marginal and accessory.”14 The performed service by 
the peer-provider must be an activity with economic value that is 
effective and genuine. Finally, to meet the last criteria, the work must not 
be volunteer work where the peer-provider does not receive any 
remuneration.  
As mentioned, the ECJ has not yet had the opportunity to apply 
these criteria on a platform worker. The closest it gets is in C-434/15 
Elite Taxi where the Court had to decide whether Uber is an information 
society service or a transport service. The AG, M. Szpunar, states very 
clearly that Uber drivers are not necessarily employees but could also be 
subcontractors, and adds that “The controversy surrounding the status 
of drivers with respect to Uber… is wholly unrelated to the legal 
questions before the Court in this case.”15 However, the AG also makes 
very clear that:   
While this control [the control performed by Uber 
towards the drivers] is not exercised in the context of a 
traditional employer-employee relationship, one should not be 
fooled by appearances. Indirect control such as that exercised 
by Uber, based on financial incentives and decentralised 
passenger-led ratings, with a scale effect, makes it possible to 
manage in a way that is just as — if not more — effective 
than management based on formal orders given by an 
employer to his employees and direct control over the 
carrying out of such orders.16 
The ECJ did not go into similar statements about the employee 
status of the Uber drivers but it did adopt the argumentation regarding 
control in their argumentation for Uber not being merely an information 
society service: 
… In addition, Uber exercises decisive influence over 
the conditions under which that service is provided by those 
drivers. On the latter point, it appears, inter alia, that Uber 
determines at least the maximum fare by means of the 
eponymous application, that the company receives that 
amount from the client before paying part of it to the non-
professional driver of the vehicle, and that it exercises a 
certain control over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and 
their conduct, which can, in some circumstances, result in 
their exclusion. 
                                                        
14 A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM(2016)356 final, 12-13 et 
seq. 
15 Advocate General in ECJ C-434/15, Elite Taxi, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:981, para 
54. 
16 AG in C-434/15 Elite Taxi, para 52. 
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That intermediation service must thus be regarded as 
forming an integral part of an overall service whose main 
component is a transport service and, accordingly, must be 
classified not as ‘an information society service’ within the 
meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34, to which 
Article 2(a) of Directive 2000/31 refers, but as ‘a service in 
the field of transport’ within the meaning of Article 2(2)(d) of 
Directive 2006/123. 17 
The Uber case can be interpreted as bringing the Uber driver a step 
closer to being regarded as an employee, but it is important to note that 
the ECJ did not address this issue directly. However, the question 
regarding the employment status of platform workers has been 
addressed in different countries.18 In the UK Employment Tribunal’s 
case, Mr. Y. Aslam vs. Uber19, the Tribunal found that Uber de facto 
controlled the drivers (as if they were workers20) regardless of what the 
formal contract stated; “… it follows from all of the above that the 
terms on which Uber rely do not correspond with the reality of the 
relationship between the organisation and the drivers…”21 ‘The reality’ 
was documented by drivers and it revealed for example how Uber 
warned the drivers when the drivers didn’t accept rides or cancelled rides 
while having the Uber App switched on. If the rating benchmark was 
not met or a minimum number of cancellation was exceeded, the 
sanctions could be a temporary deactivation or even a total deactivation 
of the driver’s account. Similar ‘realities’ can be seen in other cases 
regarding Uber22 and similar issues have been raised in cases regarding 
platforms offering other services than passenger transportation such as 
plumbing and courier services.23 The UK Court accepted that the driver’s 
                                                        
17 C-434/15 Elite Taxi, para 39 and 40. 
18 See presentation of some of the law suits at http://uberlawsuit.com/.  
19 UK Employment Tribunal, Case 2202550/2015 Mr. Y. Aslam, Mr. J. Farrar and others 
vs. Uber B.V., Uber London Ltd and Uber Britannia Ltd. The ruling was appealed to the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal but was dismissed.  
20 In the UK ‘worker’ has a broader definition than ‘employee’. The difference is not to 
be which considerations to take into account but relates to the boundaries. Thus, these 
boundaries are broader in relations to ‘worker’. Jones, Benjamin and Prassl, Jeremias in 
The Concept of ’Employee’: The Position in the UK, in Waas, Bernd (ed) and van 
Voss, Guus Heerma, Restatement of Labour Law in Europe, The Concept of Employee, I, 753 et 
seqq. In the Tribunal case, the difference between ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ was not up 
for discussion.  
21 UK Employment Tribunal, Case 2202550/2015 Mr. Y. Aslam, Mr. J. Farrar and others 
vs. Uber B.V., Uber London Ltd and Uber Britannia Ltd., para 96. 
22 See for example California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 2015, Case No. 
5371509 – reopened, and Labour Commissioner, California, Case NO. 11-46739, 
Berwick vs. Uber Technologies.  
23 The cases are mentioned in Jamie Grierson and Rob Davies, Pimlico Plumbers loses 
appeal against self-employed status, The Guardian, Fri 10 Feb 2017 15.40 GMT, 
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status as worker was only relevant when the driver is actually logged on 
to the App. However, also during the time the driver is not logged on, the 
driver can experience so-called ‘nudging’24 from Uber.25 Through 
nudging, Uber will ‘gently’ push the drivers to work more or work 
specific places by sending messages. Even though the UK case dealt with 
the UK ‘worker’ definition which is different from the Danish definition 
of employee, the case still illustrates an important point when dealing 
with intermediary platforms with a high level of self-made contractual 
framing. Misclassification of platform workers through linguistics in the 
contract is not decisive for how to perceive a peer-provider. The 
challenge here as in most cases regarding these platforms is, however, 
that if the legal position of the platform and its users mainly are to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis because of unclear legislation, this 
will not necessarily be sufficient for the majority of platform users, 
because the starting point (before cases are filed) will always be the legal 
frame set by the platform in its user-platform contracts.  
In the US (more specifically in California), several cases have also 
been tried and some have been settled. In the California cases, the so-
called Borello test is applied listing a number of elements to consider 
when determining whether a putative employee is to be regarded as 
such.26 The elements of the test are very similar to the elements 
considered in Danish and UK case law. Pursuant to the Borello test, the 
question is "whether the person [or company] to whom service is 
rendered has the right to control the manner and means of 
accomplishing the result desired"27. It is also referred to as the ‘right of 
control’-test. As is also the case in the  UK cases, the California cases 
focus on labour law rights and are therefore interpretations of the 
definition of an employee in labour law. However, if an 
                                                                                                              
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/feb/10/pimlico-loses-appeal-against-
plumbers-worker-status-in-gig-economy-case and Sarah Butler and Hilary Osborne, 
Courier wins holiday pay in key tribunal ruling on gig economy, The Guardian, Fri 6 
Jan 2017 19.39 GMT, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/06/courier-
wins-holiday-pay-in-latest-key-tribunal-ruling-for-gig-economy.   
24 ‘Nudging’ is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap to avoid”, see Loewenstein, George and Chater, Nick, Putting nudges in 
perspective, Behavioural Public Policy (2017) 1, 27 with references. 
25 Rosenblat, Alex and Stark, Luke, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: 
A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, International Journal of Communication, 2016, 10, 3758–
3784 and Rosenblat, Alex, "The Truth About How Uber's App Manages Drivers", 
Harvard Business Review, April 6, 2016.  
26 Supreme Court of California, March 23, 1989, No. S003956, S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. 
v. Dep't of Industrial Relations.  
27 Supreme Court of California, March 23, 1989, No. S003956, S.G. Borello & Sons, 
Inc. v. Dep't of Industrial Relations. 
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employee/employer relationship is established within labour law, this 
will presumably strongly indicate that the contractual relation with the 
peer-customer will be affected. Several cases in California have ruled that 
specific drivers on the platforms Uber and Lyft are to be regarded as 
employees and not independent contractors.28 In line with the UK case, 
the California cases emphasise that the reality differs from the formal 
contract, e.g. “The reality, however, is that Defendants (Uber) are 
involved in every aspect of the operation.”29 We have yet to see a class 
action ruling in this area.30 Attempts so far in the US have either been 
rejected by the court on the grounds that the cases are not suited for a 
class action31 or a settlement has been reached before the trial32.  
Without going into detail, in summary, the foreign courts have 
emphasised that the platforms (despite not being expressed in the 
contract/terms of use) control the peer-provider through sanctions (or 
warnings of sanctions), if the quality goals set by the platform are not 
met. The platforms have the power to deactivate the account at any time 
(‘terminate at will’). Also, some platforms set standards for the material 
(cars) and run background checks on the providers. In addition, the 
peer-providers are prevented from expanding their ‘business’ and might 
not be able to set their own prices or charge tips. Finally, some platforms 
offer some kind of instruction, guidance or education for their peer-
                                                        
28 See for example Labour Commissioner, California, Case NO. 11-46739, Berwick vs. 
Uber Technologies. The case is mentioned in http://qz.com/430583/a-legal-victory-for-
an-uber-driver-in-california-could-challenge-its-business-model/ og 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/17/415262801/california-labor-
commission-rules-uber-driver-is-an-employee-not-a-contractor. The ruling has been 
appealed. Same result: California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 2015, Case 
No. 5371509 – reopened. 
29 Labour Commissioner, California, Case NO. 11-46739, Berwick vs. Uber Technologies. 
The case is also mentioned in http://qz.com/430583/a-legal-victory-for-an-uber-
driver-in-california-could-challenge-its-business-model/ and 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/17/415262801/california-labor-
commission-rules-uber-driver-is-an-employee-not-a-contractor. The ruling has been 
appealed. 
30 In United States District Court, Northern District of California, C-13-3826-EMC and 
C-13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016, O ‘Connor vs. Uber Technologies, the Court denies O’Conner 
et. al. motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement with Uber on the 
grounds that it is unfair for the drivers. 
31 See for example United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 
Civil Action No. 16-23670-Civ-Scola, Sebastian A. Rojas vs. Uber Technologies, Inc. and 
others.  
32 Class action was granted to O’Connor against Uber by the United States District 
Court, Northern District of California in Case No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015. The parties 
later agreed on a settlement, but a preliminary approval was denied by the same court in 
C-13-3826-EMC and C-13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016. 
THE CONTRACTUAL PLATFORM FRAMEWORK 
   
 
74 
providers.33 Having in mind that platforms are diverse, these elements all 
speak in favour of an employee/employer relationship. On the other 
hand, the platforms have argued that they do not control the peer-
providers, because (and also according to their own standardised 
contract/terms of use) it is solely up to the peer-providers when they 
want to work (check in on the App) and what tasks they accept on the 
App. In addition, some of the peer-providers bring their own material 
and pay for their own expenses in regard to this material.  
Even though many cases so far have ruled in favour of the peer-
providers (the employees), the California courts have been reluctant to 
state with much certainty that their rulings should apply in similar cases 
without a case-by-case evaluation.34 Some of the thoughts are presented 
in the following quote from District Judge Vince Chhabria from the 
Northern District of California. And even though Mr. Chhabria works in 
another judicial system, the cases have shown similar challenges cross-
border in relations to finding the right legal box for peer-providers on 
labour platforms. 
 As should now be clear, the jury in this case will be 
handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round 
holes. The test the California courts have developed over the 
20th Century for classifying workers isn't very helpful in 
addressing this 21st Century problem. Some factors point in 
one direction, some point in the other, and some are 
ambiguous. Perhaps Lyft drivers who work more than a 
certain number of hours should be employees while the 
others should be independent contractors. Or perhaps Lyft 
drivers should be considered a new category of worker 
altogether, requiring a different set of protections. But absent 
legislative intervention, California's outmoded test for 
classifying workers will apply in cases like this. And because 
the test provides nothing remotely close to a clear answer, it 
will often be for juries to decide. That is certainly true here.35 
The quote is also valid in Denmark and emphasises that the criteria 
set up for defining an employee is not appropriate when dealing with 
platform workers. The judge reveals his concern with the case-by-case 
evaluation based on outdated criteria, and the jury is forced to put the 
platform worker (the square peg) into one of two unfit boxes (two round 
                                                        
33 See the facts of United States District Court, Northern District of California, C-13-
cv-04065-VC, 2015, Cotter vs. Lyft. 
34 The Court has denied to make a so called Summary Judgment in Case No. 13-cv-
04065-VC, Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, United States 
District Court, Northern District Of California, Cotter vs. Lyft. 
35 Vince Chhabria, United States District Judge in Case No. 13-cv-04065-VC, Order 
Denying Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment, United States District Court, 
Northern District Of California, Cotter vs. Lyft. 
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holes). Along the lines of Mr. Chhabria, some scholars have suggested a 
category of employee suited for peer-providers on intermediary 
platforms, e.g. an ‘independent worker’.36 It varies to which degree the 
scholars believe the same labour law rights should apply, but they do 
agree that this platform worker is in need of protection. An obvious 
downside if a new category of ‘worker’ is introduced is that if this worker 
is not granted the same rights and benefits as an employee, businesses in 
general might feel tempted to transform parts of their labour force into 
this ‘employee-light’ category. In regard to consumer protection, such a 
new category will more easily place the peer-provider in an employment-
like relation with the platform and this will result in the platform being 
the main contracting party of the peer-customer triggering consumer 
protection for the peer-customer.  
2.2. THE PLATFORM AS THE MAIN CONTRACTING PARTY 
In contract law, it is presumed that you are a party to the contract 
you engage in, unless it is very clear that you are not.37 As long as no 
specific legislation regulates the contractual role of platforms in the 
triangular structure, it must thus be a precondition for the platform in 
order to avoid being considered the main contracting party to clearly 
present itself as merely an intermediary when the provider and the peer-
customer engage into a contract through the platform.  
In line with this presumption, the Danish courts and the Danish 
Consumer Complaints Board38 have resolved a number of cases. After 
performing an overall assessment, the High Court of Eastern Denmark 
ruled in U2016.1062 Ø that an online travel agency platform had not 
provided sufficient information of its role as merely an intermediary. The 
terms and conditions in the user contract contained an opt-out clause, 
                                                        
36 See for example Harris, Seth, D. and Krueger, Alan B., A Proposal for Modernizing 
Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The ‘Independent Worker’, Brookings, 
December 2015. 
37 Lynge Andersen, Lennart and Madsen, Palle Bo, Aftaler og Mellemmænd, 2017. See also 
Rognstad, Ole-Andreas, Mellommenns sivilrettslige ansvar ved handel på internett, 
TemaNord 2004:512, s. 27. Same position is taken in SWD(2016) 163, Commission 
staff working document guidance on the implementation/application of directive 
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices accompanying the document 
communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the 
European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions a 
comprehensive approach to stimulating cross-border e-commerce for Europe's citizens 
and businesses, section 5.2.2.  Also, if a platform performs commercial communication 
on behalf of a peer-provider, the ID of the peer-provider must be clearly stated, cf. Lov 
om tjenester i informationssamfundet, herunder visse aspekter af elektronisk handel, 
no. 227 of 22/04/2002 (Law on E-Commerce) para 9(1).   
38 The Consumer Complaints Board is an independent board that decides consumer 
complaints. The Consumer Complaints Board consists of a chairman (a judge) and 
representatives of consumer and business organisations.  
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and in the footer and header as well as right before and after payment, 
this opt-out clause was also mentioned. The overall assessment included 
the interpretation of the information given. The Court stated that it cannot 
“be presumed that the ordinary consumer, solely based on this 
information, can deduct the consequences for his legal position in his 
relations to” the platform. This line of argumentation entails that a 
correct information given in a correct way about the platform being only 
an intermediary is not necessarily sufficient if the peer-customer (the 
consumer) is not able to understand the consequences of this information. 
This extended qualification of the duty to inform is in line with the 
tendency of consumer protection in regards to the duty to collect informed 
legal consent (“express consent and acknowledgement”)39 and also in 
line with the requirements of terms in consumer contracts in regard to 
establishing whether a term is clear.40 Other information on the 
platform’s website referred to the travel agency as ‘technical organiser’ 
and even though this information might point in favour of the platform, 
it was not considered decisive for the case. Also, it was not considered 
pivotal that travel agencies normally do not enter into contracts in their 
own name.41  
Following this case, the other regional court in Denmark ruled 
opposite when it tried a case concerning an online travel agency 
platform. In U2018.574V, the Court emphasised that from the 
homepage of the travel agency, it appears that the customer can choose 
between more than one million overnight accommodations and that the 
payment is to be paid directly to the accommodation. The name and 
address of the accommodation as well as price and duration was 
provided on the confirmation of the reservation. Also on the 
confirmation, it was stated that payment was to be made directly to the 
place of accommodation and it was also the place of accommodation 
that determined the fees for cancellation and alterations. The 
confirmation also made a referral to contact the place of accommodation 
if any problems with the booking occur. As a last point, the Court 
emphasised that the terms and conditions found on the agency’s 
homepage states that the customer enters into a contract directly with 
the accommodation and that the agency only is a liaison between the 
customer and the accommodation. Based on these facts and without 
                                                        
39 Directive 2011/83/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 25 
October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, Article 7(2). 
40 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, Article 5. 
41 Further analyses of the case, see Østergaard, Kim, Pakkerejsedirektivets krav om et 
almindeligt, forståeligt, tydeligt, klart og letlæseligt sprog, in Dahl, Børge; Riis, Thomas; 
Trzaskowski, Jan, Festskrift til Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, 2016, 564 et seqq.  
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further reasoning, the Court stated that the customer should have 
understood that the agency was not the main contracting party. The 
Court did not attach importance to the fact that the agency tried to help 
solve the problems the customer encountered because of non-
performance from the reserved place of accommodation (help to find 
other accommodation as well as payout of compensation). Neither did 
the Court mention that the customer actually typed in name and credit 
card information in the booking flow. Albeit lacking in detailed 
reasoning, this court case shows that there is a limit to how ‘inattentive’ a 
customer can be. The customer testified that he did not know that the 
platform was not the main contracting party. Different from the earlier 
court case, the Court in this case does not seem to go into interpreting 
the information given on the platform and in the confirmation. The 
Court simply acknowledges that the information is given and even 
though the platform does not explain the consequences of its contractual 
disclaimer (as was one of the focal points in the earlier case), it seems 
that the Court finds that the information is given in such a clear-cut 
manner that an explanation is unnecessary.              
Normally, the contract will form the base of the legal position of 
two parties. In line with consumer protection legislation, the mentioned 
case law as well as Board cases indicate that in regards to consumer 
contracts, there is a special consideration to be taking into account. As 
the weaker party, the (average)42 consumer must be protected against 
agreed standard terms such as opt-out clauses which (potentially) is to 
the detriment of her. Information on such terms must be provided in a 
clear and intelligible manner. Despite an opt-out clause in the terms and 
conditions, the additional information as well as the expectations of the 
consumer based on the behaviour of the platform will be decisive in 
categorising the platform as the main contracting party.43 Thus, case law 
emphasises that the opt-out clause in the terms and conditions should be 
supplemented by a clear indication of who the peer-provider is and this 
should happen preferably at the beginning of the booking flow. Also, it 
will help make the identification of the peer-provider clear, if the 
supplier explicitly is mentioned as the one performing the obligations in 
the contract.  Even though the platform in giving information uses the 
correct legal terms, case law indicates that additional information and 
                                                        
42 The notion of ’average consumer’ is developed in ECJ case law and incorporated into 
recent EU consumer protection regulation and Danish case law and statutory law. See 
Østergaard, Kim, Pakkerejsedirektivets krav om et almindeligt, forståeligt, tydeligt, klart 
og letlæseligt sprog, i Dahl, Børge; Riis, Thomas; Trzaskowski, Jan, Festskrift til Peter 
Møgelvang-Hansen, 2016, 560 et seqq. with references. See also among others Incardona, 
Rossella; Poncibó, Cristina, The average consumer, the unfair commercial practices 
directive, and the cognitive revolution, Journal of Consum Policy, 2007, 21-38.  
43 See also the application of the same principle in case law in Rechnagel, Hardy, Endnu 
en Sø- og Handelsretsdom om speditørens retlige status som fragtfører, UfR, 
U1980B.47. 
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matching behaviour also is necessary in order to ensure that the 
consumer understands that the platform is not the main contracting party.  
In late 2016, the ECJ too had the opportunity to rule in a case 
regarding a platform that potentially gives the impression of being the 
main contracting party to a consumer. In C-149/15 Wathelet, the Court 
interprets the concept of ’seller’ stemming from the Sales Directive.44 
The Court emphasises that in order to be perceived as a ‘seller’, you do 
not have to be the owner of the good. The GA, H. Saugmandsgaard Øe, 
expresses the opinion that when the platform gives the impression of 
‘seller’, the intermediary platform makes an ‘irrevocable decision’45 that 
despite the intended contractual constellation is crucial for the liability of 
the platform. The ECJ agrees with the GA and leaves it up to Member 
States to decide, when an intermediary gives the impression of a seller. As 
help for performing such an assessment, the ECJ provides some 
guidelines: The intermediary can be regarded as the seller if:  
“he fails to duly inform the consumer that he was not 
the owner of the goods in question, which involves, on the 
part of that court, taking into consideration all of the 
circumstances of the case… The degree of participation and 
the amount of effort employed by the intermediary in the 
sale, the circumstances in which the goods were presented to 
the consumer and the latter’s behaviour may, in particular, be 
relevant in that regard in order to determine whether the 
consumer could have understood that the intermediary was 
acting on behalf of a private individual.”46  
Danish case law seems to include these elements as emphasis is 
placed both on how and what information is provided and on the 
perception of the consumer.   
2.3. THE PLATFORM AS A MERE INTERMEDIARY 
Sénéchal defines the intermediary platforms as  
… a hybrid figure oscillating between distribution on their 
own behalf and intermediation with certain characteristics of the 
commercial agency while radically deviating in that the online 
                                                        
44 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 
1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees. 
45 GA in ECJ C-149/15, Wathelet, [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:840, Para 75.   
46 C-149/15 Wathelet, Para 44. See case comments in Dodsworth, Timothy J., 
Intermediaries as Sellers – a commentary on Whathelet, European Journal of Consumer and 
Market law, issue 5, 2017, 213. 
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platform has not the economic dependence of a commercial 
agent.47 
 The quote underlines that the platforms do not seem to fit into 
the commercial agent box. Consequently, if the platforms are what they 
claim they are – merely intermediaries - the question then is how they are 
regulated – if regulated at all. Besides potentially being governed by 
sectorial laws, the intermediary platforms are not governed by specific 
legislation in relations to the triangular structure other than the E-
commerce Directive.48 However, this is only partly true for the 
intermediary platforms covered by Danish law.   
2.3.1. THE DANISH INTERMEDIARY RULE 
The Danish intermediary rule was first introduced in the new 
Danish Consumer Contract Act of 1977 governing off premises selling 
and the right of withdrawal.49 The rule constitutes a part of the consumer 
definition. In Denmark, a consumer is a person who primarily acts 
outside his trade or business.50 A consumer contract is a contract 
between a consumer and a natural or legal person acting within his trade 
or business.51 The intermediary rule adds: “.... the law also applies for 
contracts on goods and services from non-traders, if the contract is 
concluded or mediated through or with the help from a business.”52 
Basically, it means that when two peers enter into a contract through a 
(business) platform, this contract becomes a consumer contract. The 
peer-customer is then protected as a consumer vis-à-vis the other private 
person (the seller). The latter then has to comply with consumer law. 
The Danish intermediary rule has lived a somewhat quiet life but has 
become pertinent with the rise of the platform economy. 
                                                        
47 Sénéchal, Juliette, The Diversity of the Services provided by Online Platforms and 
the Specificity of the Counter-performance of these Services -  A double Challenge for 
European and National Contract Law, EuCML 5, 2016, 41. 
48 It must be presumed that an intermediary platform which is governed by sector 
specific law also is a service provider within the scope of the E-commerce Directive. 
See a discussion on the application of the E-commerce Directive and platforms in 
Cauffman, Caroline, The Commission’s European Agenda for the Collaborative 
Economy – (Too) Platform and Service Provider Friendly? EuCML 6, 2016, 235 – 243. 
49 See for more information on the Danish intermediary rule: M. J. Sørensen, Digitale 
formidlingsplatforme - formidlingsreglen i dansk forbrugerret, UfR, U2017B.119 and 
M. J. Sørensen, Uber – a business model in search of a new contractual legal frame, 
EuCML 1, 2016, 15 -19.  
50 The Consumer Contract Law, no. 1457 of 12/17/2013, para 2(3) as well as all other 
consumer protection laws within the area of civil law.   
51 The Consumer Contract Law, no. 1457 of 12/17/2013, para 2(1) and other civil law 
legislation on consumer protection.  
52 Now to be found in The Consumer Contract Law, no. 1457 of 12/17/2013, para 
2(3) as well as all other consumer protection laws within the area of civil law.    
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In 1977, the Danish legislators were of the opinion that the need 
for protection of the peer-customer “presumably significantly” is the 
same when contracting through an intermediary as it is when the 
intermediary itself is the contracting party.53 In the preparatory work, it is 
clarified that the peer-customer in both situations negotiates with a 
professional, but the peer-customer is not aware that the main 
contracting party (the provider) is not a professional, when the 
intermediary is only an intermediary. This is underlined by referring to 
the fact that the intermediary often puts a standard contract at the 
disposal of the parties.54 In 1978, the intermediary rule was added to the 
Danish Sales Act for the same reason55: “The crucial point is that the 
peer-customer negotiate with a professional who often possess a 
superior level of expertise.”56 The preparatory work goes on to state as 
an example that goods bought at auctions performed by a business 
platform should be seen as a consumer purchase if the good is to be 
used for private purposes by the consumer.           
The intermediary rule does not refer to known agency figures.57 It 
consists of three cumulative criteria: 1) The intermediary must act within 
his trade or business;58 2) The intermediary must play an active part in 
the transaction between the peer-customer and the peer-provider;59 
Lastly, 3) the intermediary must not be the main contracting party or act 
in its own name. Of specific interest is the second criteria, which will be 
unfolded in the following paragraph. 
Active part 
To be regarded as an active part under the Danish intermediary 
rule, the intermediary has to do more than just connect the two 
contracting parties. If the intermediary only provides space on its 
website, a billboard or other passive possibilities of exchange of contact 
information, according to the preparatory work, this will not constitute 
                                                        
53 L 39, 1977 om Forslag til Lov om visse forbrugeraftaler, comments on Para 1(4). 
(preparatory work of the Danish Consumer Contract Act) 
54 L 39, 1977 om Forslag til Lov om visse forbrugeraftaler, comments on Para 1(4). 
(preparatory work of the Danish Consumer Contract Act) 
55 Bekendtgørelse af lov om køb, no 140 of 17/02/2014. 
56 L 119, 1978-1979 Forslag til Lov om ændring af købeloven, comments on Para 4a(2). 
Later repeated in L 220, 2004 om visse forbrugeraftaler og om ændring af lov om 
forsikringsaftaler og lov om beskatningen af pensionsordninger m.v., Section 4.2.1.1.  
57 See Karstoft, Susanne, Retlig regulering af ’elektroniske loppemarkeder’, UfR, 
U2006B.55. 
58  L 39, 1977 om Forslag til Lov om visse forbrugeraftaler, comments on Para 1(4). 
and Betænkning no. 845/1978 om forbrugerkøb, 59. (both preparatory work of the 
Danish Consumer Contract Act). 
59 L 39, 1977 om Forslag til Lov om visse forbrugeraftaler, comments on Para 1(4) and 
L 27, 1994 om Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om aftaler og andre retshandler på 
formuerettens område og visse andre love, comments on Para 38a. 
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as an active intermediary.60 If the platform praises the goods or services 
or in other ways takes part in the negotiations or transaction, it will be 
regarded as an active part and the intermediary rule will apply if the two 
other criteria are met. Defining the criterion of active participation has 
been the focal point in a couple of Danish cases.  
In SH2009.N.0001.07 from June 18 2009 (QXL), the Maritime and 
Commercial Court found the online auction platform QXL to be an 
active intermediary. The argumentation can be divided into two: Firstly, 
the Court found that QXL was acting as agent for the peer-provider 
(authorised to act on behalf of the peer-provider) based on the fact that a 
contract was automatically concluded as soon as the peer-customer won 
the bidding round. Secondly, QXL participated significantly in the 
entering into contract between the peer-provider and peer-customer by 
making available a promoting and professional distance selling system. In 
addition, the contract was concluded by filling out a form drawn up by 
QXL and later confirmed by QXL. QXL received a fee for each contract 
concluded. In a second Court ruling, U2000.2559 Ø (Regional East 
Court), the Court was also of the opinion (though without stating on 
what ground) that a lawyer met the criteria of the intermediary rule when 
intermediating a sale of property between two peers. The lawyer handled 
the negotiation on behalf of the provider and produced all 
documentation. It was without bearing that the peer-customer himself 
was represented by a legal advisor. Also, in a statement from the Danish 
Consumer Ombudsman, no. 08/04028, the Ombudsman found that a 
business intermediating contracts between two peers was an active 
intermediary because it collected a fee for each contract and provided a 
payment system for the two parties.   
The legal consequences 
In the mentioned QXL case, the Court ruled that QXL is governed 
by the intermediary rule which means that the contract between the 
peer-provider and the peer-customer is to be regarded as a consumer 
contract. According to the Court, this also means that certain 
information duties contained in consumer protection legislation is 
triggered and this information (e.g. information about the right of 
withdrawal)61,62 is to be provided by QXL.63 QXL had given some 
                                                        
60 Betænkning nr. 845/1978 om forbrugerkøb, sp. 18 and L 27, 1994 Forslag til Lov om 
ændring af lov om aftaler og andre retshandler på formuerettens område og visse andre 
love, comments on Para 38a(3). 
61 See also case from the Consumer Ombudsman FOM 08/04028. 
62 Rognstad finds that the expectations to the role of the intermediary also can 
create a ground for liability for information for the intermediary. This means that the 
commercial practice regulation will influence the area, cf. Rognstad, Ole-Andreas, 
Mellommenns sivilrettslige ansvar ved handel på internett, TemaNord 2004:512, 
Section 3.4. 
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general information about consumer rights, but the Court did not find 
the information sufficient. Placing the information duty on the 
intermediary also finds support in the preparatory work of the 
intermediary rule: 
The starting point is that it is the business intermediary who is 
required to fulfill the duty of information and that notice about the 
exercise of the right of withdrawal etc. can be given to the 
intermediary. The counterparty of the peer-customer is, however, 
still the peer-provider and obligations and rights that follow from 
the (consumer) contract lies therefor with the two peers and not 
the intermediary.64,65  
However, whether a specific information duty lies with the 
intermediary or the peer-provider has to be determined by an 
“interpretation of the specific rule in the Act.”66 Thus, when the 
legislation refer to a ‘business’ or a ‘trader’ to give certain information, it 
must be assessed whether it is the intermediary or the private peer-
provider who is the obligated party. The preparatory Report No. 
1440/2004 states that ”the starting point is that the rules must be 
interpreted in line with the wording of the text…”, which means that 
when the rules refer to the ‘business’, it refers to the intermediary.67 This, 
however, only applies to information duties and to the duty to receive 
notice on right of withdrawal from the peer-customer.  
QXL tried to argue against an obligation to give information by 
referring to the principle of exemption of liability for intermediaries in 
                                                                                                              
63 Relevant in the case is the Danish Consumer Contract Act and the Danish law on e-
commerce. See for a general discussion on information duties of platforms in 
Wendehorst, Christiane, Platform Intermediary Services and Duties under the E-
Commerce Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive, EuCML 5, 2016 and in 
Sandfeld Jacobsen, Søren, Formidleransvaret i forbindelse med sociale tjenester på 
internettet, UfR, U2009B.291. 
64 L 220, 2004 om visse forbrugeraftaler og om ændring af lov om forsikringsaftaler og 
lov om beskatningen af pensionsordninger m.v., bemærkningerne til § 3. (preparatory 
work for the Danish Consumer Contract Act) 
65 See a discussion of the scope of the Consumer Rights Directive in regards to digital 
platforms and a general discussion of the information duty of the intermediary, 
Wendehorst, Christiane, Platform Intermediary Services and Duties under the E-
Commerce Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive, EuCML 5, 2016, 30 et seqq. 
and Možina, Damjan, Retail business, platform services and information duties, 
EuCML 5, 2016, 25 et seqq. 
66 L 220, 2004 om visse forbrugeraftaler og om ændring af lov om forsikringsaftaler og 
lov om beskatningen af pensionsordninger m.v., bemærkningerne til § 3. (preparatory 
work for the Danish Consumer Contract Act) 
67 Betænkning 1440/2004 om revision af forbrugeraftaleloven, p. 106 (Karnov 
edition)(preparatory work for the Danish Consumer Contract Act) 
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Article 16 of the Danish E-commerce Act68 implementing the E-
commerce Directive. The Court rejected this argument with reference to 
the active participation of QXL that exempted them from the scope of 
application of the liability exemption rules in Articles 14-16.  
In Danish law, the information duties in the consumer protection 
legislation are sanctioned with fines. Thus, the platforms can face a fine 
if they do not comply with the information duties triggered by the 
intermediary rule. The consumer can still only claim his material 
consumer protection rights (e.g. the right of withdrawal and right to 
remedies) towards the provider. As a consequence, in the case where the 
information duty lies with the platform, the civil law sanctions are still put 
upon the peer-provider, as she in the case of information about the right 
of withdrawal then has to provide the legally stated extended period of 
the right of withdrawal to the consumer.   
The EU Commission has expressed concern with rules such as the 
Danish intermediary rule as it, in their opinion, is too burdensome on the 
peer-provider.69 The Commission states:  
In line with EU consumer and marketing rules, Member 
States are encouraged to seek a balanced approach to ensure that 
consumers enjoy a high level of protection in particular from 
unfair commercial practices, while not imposing disproportionate 
information obligations and other administrative burdens on 
private individuals who are not traders but who provide services 
on an occasional basis.”70  
Determining a ‘balanced approach’ is ultimately a policy question. 
The downside of the ‘balance’ prompted by the Danish intermediary rule 
is that the protection of the peer-customer might be illusory as the peer-
provider is unable to support the costs associated with compliance with 
consumer protection legislation and therefore might not provide 
consumer protection in practice. In addition, when the peer-provider is 
to be regarded as a business/trader within the contractual triangular 
structure, it is unclear whether this classification will influence the 
application of sector specific regulation such as hotel regulation which 
presumably is inadequate in P2P relations.    
In relation to legal certainty and transparency, the intermediary rule 
has an advantage as it eliminates the legal uncertainty as to whether the 
                                                        
68 Lov nr. 227 af 22. april, 2002 om tjenester i informationssamfundet herunder visse 
aspekter af elektronisk handel (Law on E-commerce). 
69 A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM(2016)356 final, section 
2.1. See a critical analyses of this agenda, Cauffman, Caroline, The Commission’s 
European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy – (too) Platform and Service 
Provider Friendly?, Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Working Paper No. 
2016/07.  
70 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A 
European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM(2016)356 final, 11. 
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peer-provider is a private person or a business. This is a challenge for 
other Member States and the EU without the intermediary rule.71   
2.4. THE PLATFORM AS A SECONDARY OBLIGATED PARTY 
Seemingly, Danish and EU contractual consumer protection law is 
based on a two party relationship between a provider and a peer-
customer (chain economy). In regards to the two-sided market, the 
platform economy is constructed as a triangular contractual relationship 
with the platform in one corner and a provider and customer in the two 
other corners, respectively. Even though the contract between the 
provider and the customer (the main contract) is concluded with the help 
of the platform and sometimes with great influence from the platform, 
according to contract law, the contractual obligations lies only with the 
provider and the customer. Even if the two parties of the main contract 
wanted to obligate the platform in any way, this would not be possible as 
it would be contrary to the principle of relativity of contracts as well as 
freedom of contract. Aside from the exception in the second legal frame, 
this section will briefly elaborate on how, within the current contractual 
legal paradigm, the platform could perhaps in some other situations be 
obligated in regards to the main contract.  
In the triangular business structure, the peer-customer does not 
only engage into a contract with the provider (the main contract). The 
peer-customer also engages into a consumer contract with the platform 
when accepting the terms and conditions for the use of the platform (the 
user contract).72 Normally, this contract is disconnected from the main 
contract between the provider and the peer-customer. Some Danish legal 
theorists claim that in modern contract law, a tendency towards a more 
objectified contract law can be traced.73 Thus, there has been a 
movement away from the subjective theory of interpretation based on 
the will of the parties. This appears valid especially in the case of 
consumer contracts, where presumably there is a weak party who should 
be protected against the will of the trader.74 The following examples can 
be given in this regard: In the unfairness test in regards to unfair 
consumer contracts, one part of the test is whether the consumer would 
have engaged into a contract if he knew/understood a specific term.75 
                                                        
71 The EU Commission suggests a maximum for the peer-provider, so that when the 
peer-provider exceeds a threshold of turnover, income, number of sales or other, the 
peer-provider becomes a business, A European Agenda for the Collaborative 
Economy, COM(2016)356 final. 
72 See for a discussion of the acceptance of ’terms of use’ as ‘a contract’, Larsen, 
Torsten Bjørn and Feldthusen, Rasmus Kristian: De sociale mediers brugervilkår del I – 
aftalen, Erhvervsjuridisk Tidsskrift, T.2016.266. 
73 Bryde Andersen, Mads, Opgør med relativitetsprincippet, UfR, U2001.121. Ulfbeck, 
Vibe, Kontrakters relativitet, 1. ed, 2000, 47 et seqq. 
74 See also Bryde Andersen, Mads, Opgør med relativitetsprincippet, UfR, U2001.121. 
75 ECJ C-415/11, Aziz, [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:164, Para 69. 
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Another part of the unfairness test is to compare the contested term 
with mandatory law in the area. If the term gives the consumer less 
protection/benefits, this will indicate that the term is unfair.76 Also, if a 
term differs from mandatory law, the term has to be presented in a very 
clear and intelligible manner to be valid. If it is not clear and intelligible, 
it must be interpreted most favourable to the consumer.77 Moving away 
from weighing the will especially of the trader makes room for the theory 
of interpretation involving the expectation of the consumer. In the outline 
edition of the DCFR, it is stated that 
 
The protection of reasonable reliance and expectations is a 
core aim of the DCFR, just as it was in PECL. Usually this 
protection is achieved by holding the mistaken party to the 
obligation which the other party reasonably assumed was being 
undertaken.78 
 
 One of the arguments for the Danish intermediary rule was exactly 
that the peer-customer is given the impression that the intermediary 
somehow plays a part in the main contract. The platform might give this 
impression either by failing to give sufficient information about their 
intermediary role or by giving the impression that the platform somehow 
puts up guarantees for the performance in the main contract. The latter 
might be the case if the platform informs the peer-customer, or as part 
of its brand gives the impression to the peer-customer that the platform 
checks the providers, educates them, monitors them, controls them etc. 
Also, the platform might enhance this impression by making commercial 
statements like ‘we deliver good service’ related to their business as a 
whole in order to boost their brand. Applying a high level of consumer 
protection as aimed for and expressed in the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the Internal Market,79 one cannot rule out that there might be cases 
where the peer-customer could have developed such reasonable 
expectation about the platform’s part as a guarantor for elements of the 
main contract. What exactly the platform guarantees will depend on the 
specific information/branding. As such a ‘guarantor’, the platform will 
be liable together with the provider for non-performance of the main 
contract if ‘the guarantee’ is related to the performance. If ‘the guarantee’ 
is more related to the provider (background check and control) or the 
                                                        
76 C-415/11, Aziz, Para 68. 
77 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, Article 5. 
78 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR), Outline Edition, Edited by Christian von Bar, Eric Clive; 
Schulte-Nölke, Hans; Beale, Hugh; Herre, Johnny; Huet, Jérôme; Storme, Matthias; 
Swann, Stephen; Varul, Paul; Veneziano, Anna and Fryderyk Zoll, Sellier, 2009, 73. 
79 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 114 and 169.  
THE CONTRACTUAL PLATFORM FRAMEWORK 
   
 
86 
services performed by the platform itself, the platform could be liable for 
damage in that regard.     
Another specific challenge stemming from the triangular structure 
is if the platform controls all information given to the peer-customer. 
The peer-customer and the provider cannot always contact each other 
directly as their identity is not known to the other party before entering 
into a contract. This limits the provider’s ability to apply with his 
information duties. If the provider is a business or the triangular setup is 
governed by the Danish intermediary rule, the duty to inform is the 
extended duties in consumer protection legislation. One could argue that 
the platform is obligated to give this information either in general, as 
they seem to be the closest to provide the (pre-contractual) information, 
or in the situations where they do not make it possible for the supplier to 
give the information to the consumer. This is in line with the notion that 
whoever controls the flow of information should also be obligated to 
provide it.       
(Economic) risk is also an issue one could discuss when looking at 
the triangular business structure. Assessment of risk is related to social 
considerations and policy. However, normally, contractual 
considerations about risk will be related to the distribution of risk 
between two contracting parties. In the triangular structure, the provider 
and peer-customer bear the risk of the main contract. The platform bears 
the risk of running a business that is depended on a large number of 
users.  In most cases, if the platform collects provision for each contract, 
this provision is not repaid if the contract is breached. Also, on some 
platforms, the users do not have to engage into contract to give the 
platform a profit. The platform can earn a profit from selling the data 
collected from the users and from selling advertisements - regardless of 
transactions on the platform. Thus, one might say that the possibility of 
earnings does not seem to follow the (economic) risk and traditionally, 
alignment of risk and profit is a law and economics issue that influences 
contract law.80 From the point of view of who is nearest to bear the 
risk,81 it might be tempting to point the finger at the platform in the case 
where both the provider and customer are peers. It would not be 
impossible to imagine arguments about risk and control in combination 
with the argument on reasonable expectations or guarantees. In C-
434/15, the GA stated:  
 
“… I take the view that the finding made immediately above 
prevents Uber being treated as a mere intermediary between 
drivers and passengers. Drivers who work on the Uber platform 
do not pursue an independent activity that exists independently of 
                                                        
80 Bryde Andersen, Mads, Grundlæggende aftaleret, 2013, 456.  
81 More on who is the nearest to bear the risk in Madsen, Christian Frank and 
Østergaard, Kim, Nærmest til at bære risikoen i kontraktretten, Juristen, 2, 2017. 
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the platform. On the contrary, the activity exists solely because of 
the platform, without which it would have no sense.”82 
 
 Despite the fact that the quote aims to argue for Uber being a 
supplier of transportation and not just a service provider, the quote also 
indicates that the platform in this case cannot be seen as a party 
disconnected from the main contract (‘as a mere intermediary’).  
Lastly, there are some non-party considerations that can be 
addressed in viewing the triangular contractual structure of platforms. It 
is not new that contract law holds non-party considerations such as 
social responsibility and the promotion of welfare.83 It depends on one’s 
political stand how (if at all) these issues should be taken into 
consideration when looking at the contractual structure of platforms. 
The platforms help cut transaction costs through easy and standardised 
access to relevant parties. The platforms also expand the market and in 
some ways boost competition. Because of the reliance on a crucial 
number of users, in some sectors of business platforms could, however, 
be counter productive for the market. The labour platforms might 
supply a new way of income for people outside the labour market.84 On 
the other hand, labour platforms do not necessarily feel obligated to 
follow rules on minimum wage and other rights constituted in labour law 
and therefore can be accused of undermining the labour marked as well 
as performing unfair competition.85 The list of pros and cons of these 
platforms are much longer, but this short list illustrates, that arguments 
fitting many different political views can be found. However, as with the 
risk assessment, these considerations are traditionally linked to contract 
law governing the contract between two parties. It will probably be 
relevant to take these considerations into account, if a specific regulation 
of platforms was to be formulated.  
                                                        
82 AG C-434/15 Elite Taxi, Para 56. 
83 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR), Outline Edition, Edited by Christian von Bar, Eric Clive; 
Schulte-Nölke, Hans; Beale, Hugh; Herre, Johnny; Huet, Jérôme; Storme, Matthias; 
Swann, Stephen; Varul, Paul; Veneziano, Anna and Fryderyk Zoll, Sellier, 2009, 14. See 
also Lynge Andersen, Lennart and Madsen, Palle Bo, Aftaler og mellemmænd, 7. ed, 
Karnov Group, 2017, 117 and Bryde Andersen, Mads, Opgør med 
relativitetsprincippet, UfR, U2001.121. 
84 See for example De Stefano, Valerio, The Rise of the ‘just-in-time workforce’: On-
demand work, crowdwork and labour protection in the ‘gig-economy’, International 
Labour Office Geneva, No 71, Inwork. 
85 See for example Adams, Abi; Freedland, Mark; Prassl, Jeremias, The ‘Zero-Hours 
Contract’: Regulating Casual Work, or Legitimating Precarity, University of Oxford Legal 
Research Paper Series, No 00/2015. 
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3. FINISHING REMARKS 
This contribution has analysed and discussed four existing potential 
legal frames to apply to the triangular contractual structure of platforms. 
As with all legal frameworks, weighed principles and considerations 
result in criteria that have to be met in order for the platform to be 
governed by the framework. Even though the Danish intermediary rule 
(the second legal frame) is burdensome on the provider and the 
benchmark for sufficient information (the third legal frame) for 
disclaiming can be discussed and challenged, these two legal frames are 
both fitted to the triangular structure and do not seem to result in 
situations in conflict with their purpose – mainly the protection of the 
peer-customer (the consumer). However, in order to have an effect, 
firstly, the peer-customer has to be aware of his legal position and 
secondly, he has to be able and willing to pursue his rights. The 
triangular structure makes the conditions hard for these legal frames to 
be effective because the platform to a large extent controls information 
and because the counter party of the platform presumably is a weak 
peer-customer. The employee framework as well as the framework of a 
secondary obligated party are not designed to the triangular structure and 
seem to conflict with underlying considerations when platforms enter 
the scene. Here, ‘reality’ floats on top of the carpet of legal boxes. As a 
consequence, the considerations about social security, consumer 
protection, and ultimately welfare that traditionally justify both labour 
law and consumer law are challenged. Whether these considerations are 
also relevant in the case of platforms is of course a policy question, but if 
there is a need to take regulatory steps to respond to this potentially 
unintended challenge of the underlying considerations, there are several 
ways to go. In broad terms, there are three headlines for such next steps: 
1. Regulation, 2. Self-regulation and 3. Regulating/facilitating self-
regulation. A step within the first headline is taken by a group of 
European researchers (The ELI working group).86 The group is a 
continuation of the Research Group on the Law of Digital Services. It is 
still a work in progress, but through a Draft of European Model Rules 
for Online Intermediary Platforms (MRD),87 the working group aims to 
                                                        
86 The Model Rules Draft is drafted by a group of 35 researchers from 10 different EU 
countries (the ELI working group) who started the work in 2015. The group is a 
continuation of the Research Group on the Law of Digital Services and is lead by C. 
Busch; H. Schulte-Nölke; A. Wiewiórowska-Domagalska; F. Zoll and G. Dannemann. 
Since 2017, the project has been incorporated as a project of the European Law 
Institute (ELI).  
87 An early draft is published in  Bush, Christoph; Schulte-Nölke, Hans; Wiewiórowska-
Domagalska, Aneta; Dannemann, Gerhard and Zoll, Frederic, ´Discussion Draft of a 
Directive on Online Intermediary Platforms´(2016), 4 European Journal of Consumer and 
Market law, 164. See some critical thoughts on this Discussion Draft in Maultzsch, 
Felix, ‘Contractual Liability of Online Platform Operators: European Proposals and 
Established Principles’ (2017), Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main 
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provide a general piece of legislation securing transparency as well as 
allocating risk in the triangular structure. The preliminary scope is 
primarily platforms where users register in order to engage into contract 
with each other. The MRD is sector neutral and follows in line of 
existing EU consumer (contract) law, especially the consumer acquis 
which to a large extent employs information duties as the preferred 
regulatory technique. The MRD is still undergoing adjustments, but two 
of the more innovative proposed provisions are specifically relevant to 
present here in the light of the four legal frames discussed in this 
article.88 The two provisions constitute parts of the proposed liability 
regime in the MRD. The first provision entails that if a platform obtains 
credible evidence of illegal conduct by a user and this conduct potentially 
is harmful to another user engaging into contract with the first user, the 
platform is obliged to take adequate measures in order to protect the 
users. If the platform fails to take these measures, it becomes liable for 
damage caused by this failure. The provision contains elements from the 
e-commerce legislation, complicity rules in criminal law as well as tort 
law. In regard to the challenges in the four legal frames, this provision 
allocates some of the contractual as well as non-contractual risk present 
when two parties engage into contract/contact. The damaged user can 
make his claim either to the platform or to the other user. Albeit not 
obligating the platform to monitor the users, the provision allocates risk 
to the platform, because of the platform’s ability to control the users’ 
access to the platform. In addition to this alignment of control and risk, 
the provision also is an obvious accommodation of the expectation a 
user might have to the platform in situations like these. Apart from the 
sanctions for the platform, this provision is in alignment with the 
platform’s own incentive to create and preserve trust as the most 
important requisite for the triangular business structure. The second of 
the two selected MDR liability provisions states that if a customer can 
reasonably rely on the platform having predominant influence over the 
provider, the platform and the provider are joint liable for breach of the 
main contract. The provision is supplemented with a non-exhaustive list 
of elements to consider when determining whether the customer has this 
reasonable reliance. The list refers to how the contract is concluded; 
whether the platform can withhold payments from the customer; who 
determines the content of the main contract; who sets the price etc. 
Similar to the first provision, this provision aligns risk and control 
(predominant influence) – this time, the rights conferred upon the peer-
customer relate specifically to the non-performance of the main contract. 
Also, in this provision, a strong emphasis is placed on reliance 
                                                                                                              
< https://ssrn.com/abstract=3074301>  < http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3074301> 
accessed July 6, 2018.    
88 A commentary of an early draft of the Model Rules Draft (when it was a proposal for 
a Directive) is in press and is expected to be published in the fall of 2018.  
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(expectation). The provision seems to accommodate most of the 
considerations discussed in the fourth legal frame regarding quasi 
guarantees, expectations and control. In contrast to the first liability 
provision, without this second provision, the platform might not have 
incentive by itself to undertake the risk allocated to it in the provision. 
Thus, this provision will in fact provide an allocation of risk which most 
likely would not be actualised otherwise. As the criterion of 
‘predominant influence’ (also in combination with ‘reliance’) is open-
ended, the application of the provision will often be preconditioned by a 
case-by-case evaluation. This weakens the effectiveness of the provision 
as the platform controls the initial legal contractual framing of the 
triangular structure and the starting point will there for presumably be 
the self-definition as ‘intermediary’ disclaiming all liability.    
If step number 2 regarding self-regulation is preferred, the 
platforms will find themselves floating on top of the carpet of legally 
defined boxes because it does not fit into the boxes, and they will thus 
create their own ‘legal’ environment applicable on the triangular 
contractual structure. Because the two-sided business structure is based 
on trust through reputation, the platform’s interests will to a certain 
extent be aligned with the interests of the legislators (and users). 
However, in regard to transparency and extended liability, there will 
most likely be discrepancies. To a certain extent, these discrepancies 
could perhaps be squared up by supplementing the self-regulation with 
facilitating regulation (step 3) such as putting up (technical) standards for 
review systems, payment systems etc. as well as open-ended 
provisions/standards on behaviour.  
Without additional regulation or regulation of self-regulation, the 
four legal frames presented in this contribution will apply. Whether these 
frames provide the right balance between all the different relevant 
considerations, such as consumer protection and protection of peer-
providers on one side and market development on the other side, is 
ultimately a question of policy. This contribution has aimed to qualify 
future legal and political work in regard to this balance.   
 
